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Abstract: Current global economic trends create a new economic environment for Croatia. They could
be described, by two processes amongst others. The first is clear enough abandonment of
basic determinants of transitional economic policy defined as ‘Washington consensus’.
Change of ‘tide’ could be observed in redesigned behavior of both transition architects,
International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Even before recent global crisis IMF was
revising its approach towards fixed exchange rate and WB has been displaying ‘change of
heart’, placing development instead of stabilization on its core agenda sheet. The other
process is global financial and expected overall economic crisis seemingly comparable to




External Challenges of Post Transitional Period
Observation of post transitional period is determined by its definition, or more
precisely by the point of ‘return’ of main macroeconomic indicators to their ‘starting’
pretransitional level. In simpler version the whole process is being reduced to a level
of per capita GDP with installed assumption that reaching its pretransitional level
signalizes the end of transitional period.
On the first sight, it is a simple analysis of easily understandable facts. However,
even here the unexpected space for dissonant interpretations has been created. Their
origin is mainly in alternative choices of base period.
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Promoters of so called ‘Washington consensus’, i.e. shock therapy that has
enveloped swift privatization, price and capital BOP account liberalization and hard
budget constraints fiscal stabilization policy have been performing their analysis on
base 1990 year.
Promoters of ‘Transitional gradualism’, so called ‘gradualists’ who have been
warning primarily about the problem of institutional vacuum, which occurs in the
space between sudden destruction of planned mechanism and still inadequate market
institutions stimulating reconstitution of ex-political nomenclature into a new
economic mafia, are using 1989 as the base year.
Proponents of shock therapy have derived their economic ‘recipes’ from
Schumpeterian version of ‘creative destruction’. By exploring failures of
economic/market reforms dating from 1980’s in planned economies, they have come
to a conclusion that a democratization and political transition are not possible without
destruction of an economic fundament of central-planned economies. Any delay in
this matter would disable transition and open a possibility of reverse process. Process
of ‘instant’ transition was theoretically explained by famous J-curve (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Transition J-curve
The interpretation of J-curve distills to a statement that determined market
transformation of ex-planned economies, i.e. fast privatization, decomposition of
giant state owned industry conglomerates and hard budget constraint
implementation, will lead to a temporary fall of business activity i.e. GDP, but soon
benefits of market allocation of scarce resources will take place which will result in
fast growth. The estimated recovery time and reaching pretransition level of GDP
varied from couple of months to couple of years (usually three).
96 Ivo Druiæ, Irena Ragu and Ivan Toliæ
Proponents of shock therapy concentrated in research enclaves sponsored and
technical missions financed by funds of international financial institutions, primarily
IMF (International Monetary Fund) and WB (World Bank), have encountered,
amongst others, two problems which made validity of their concept questionable.
The first problem is that a decade of real GDP trends, bearing in mind that it is not
precisely determined whether J-curve implies movements of rates of change or level
of GDP, does not confirm existence of J-curve for numerous transition countries,
especially Russia and countries of south-eastern Europe (Gabrisch/Holscher,
2006:13).
The second problem is that reaching pretransitional level of GDP took much
longer than predicted transitional recession, thereby overtaking characteristics of real
depression that can be compared by its effects with Great Depression in developed
market economies in the 1930’s. Probably in the need for more convenient
interpretation of effects of transition recipes, sublimed in ‘letter of intent’ and
‘Stand-by’ arrangements between transition economies and above mentioned
institutions, the ‘silent’ revision of base year begun. In the early 90’s base year was
1989, evidently the last year of planned economies in Eastern Europe i.e. the last year
of pretransitional period. However, later on 1990 became more common as a base
year. Since there is an evident fall in real GDP of 10-15% in most of transition
economies between 1989, the last year of old, and 1990, the first year of new
economic system, it is evident that by changing the base year the base becomes lower
i.e. it registers smaller decrease in GDP later on. But even in this methodological
‘innovation’ data show that even after 10 years of transition a great number of
countries has not reached pretransitional level of their economic activity measured by
GDP per capita. For instance in the year 2000, only 5 out of 12 European transition
countries reached 1990 level of GDP. At the same time, out of 12 countries that were
created after USSR dissolution none of them has managed to reach the 1990 level by
the year 2000 (The World Bank, 2002:5).
Promoters of gradualism (‘gradualists’) take off from a concept of transition as
fundamental institutional, social, political and cultural change. The most important
effect of these changes in economic sphere is fundamental change of government role
in economic activity. Emphasized need for gradualism emerges from the fact that, as
oppose to developed market economies where government holds external position by
defining set of rules according to which the participants in economic activity will
behave, in transition economies the government role is ‘internalized’ because it itself
becomes a participant in changes i.e. a part of transition process. In this situation the
problem of asymmetric information and moral hazard is accentuated, which can
instead of transition from plan to market, lead to ‘transition’ from ‘dictatorship to
disorder’ (Djankov et.al. 2003). By stressing out a problem of missing institutions
‘gradualists’ pay their critical attention to neglected institutional framework of shock
Croatian Economy Challenges in the Posttransitional Period 97
therapy concept. According to them, the main problem in dominant shock therapy
implementation is that by emphasizing the need for faster decomposition of
government-planned mechanism, as the basic obstacle to potential reverse processes,
they have ‘overlooked’ irreplaceable role of formal and informal institutional frame.
That resulted in doubtful outcome and unnecessarily decelerated transition process.
To support their assertions ‘gradualists’ rely, amongst others, on the analysis of
economic indicators claiming 1989 as base year. In such an analysis results i.e.
successes are notably modest. In 2002 out of 16 European transition economies 9 of
them did not reach pretransitional level of GDP and 3 of them have just slightly
exceeded it. When the level of GDP per capita is 1989=100, more eminent role play
only Poland (127), Slovenia (118), Hungary (117) and ex-Eastern Germany (115)
(Gabrisch/Holscher, 2006:14).
In addition to the base year the other problem is the mere measurement of GDP.
Between various ways of GDP accounting increasingly dominating became
purchasing power parity method (PPP). It surely has its advantages because it
partially explains the difference between ‘real’ and ‘nominal’ life standard which is
‘hidden’ in significant volume of barter trade in less developed countries, and in
‘unofficial’ economy i.e. in ‘gray’ sector and ‘black’ market of developed and
transition countries. But its problem, amongst others, is in lesser key macroeconomic
variables behavior comparability. Namely, while GDP is calculated in ‘virtual’ PPP
USD, balance of payments data, external debt, foreign investments etc. are being
calculated in ‘hard’ USD according to an official exchange rate of national currency.
Problems of accelerated increase of external indebtedness and increasing
external-trade deficit are trade marks of post transitional Croatian economic
developments. That is the reason why official exchange rate 1990 USD as a GDP
measure has been used in analysis of Croatian economy performances here
conducted.
The further problem is the other variables’ i.e. indicators’ actual performance that
illustrates entire complexity and controversial results of transition. Firstly, the
employment i.e. unemployment trend represents one of not yet surpassed transition
problems. Even the substitution of regular registered unemployment data with the
Labor Force Survey indicator of unemployment does not provide encouraging
enough results, so two-digit unemployment rate is the characteristic of the most
transition countries even today. In addition, absolute fall in volume of industrial
production in most transition countries still is not compensated.
All those trends have directed of Croatian economy analysis towards a broader
scope encompassing prices and inflation, employment/unemployment and labor
productivity issues in addition to economic growth controversies.
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Growth and Investments
GDP growth rate trend shows evident signs of recovery. Undoubting growth rate
recovery should be put in a context of phenomena which could be described as
growth rate paradox. In standard analysis growth is measured by both average growth
rate and average per capita growth rate. The difference between these two growth
rates is the population growth rate. In this sense it was believed in mainstream
economic analysis that per capita growth rate was more realistic (lower) indicator,
because it includes population growth. However, since the middle of 1990, there has
been an inverse trend in Croatia due to which the average rate of GDP growth is lower
than the average rate of GDP per capita growth (Figure 2).
The paradox of lower GDP growth rate compared to per capita GDP growth rate is
the consequence of negative Croatian population growth rate. During the 1990’s and
in 2000’s Croatian population is decreasing, due to homeland war, lower birth rate
and intensified migrations. Particularly concerning is negative birth rate as a result of
mortality exceeding fertility rate.
In earlier population analysis main cause of unfavorable trends has been
migration trends with higher emigration than immigration. These trends were in the
past mostly overcome by positive birth rate which guaranteed population vitality.
But, in the second half of 1990’s and beginning of 2000’s combined unfavorable
effect of both birth rate and migration escalated into a situation where crucial
questions of reason and need of every day business activity and economic growth are
being set in the new light. This ‘new’ light was produced by recent statistically
documented demographic research. Thorough analysis of population trends during
20th century has made relevant projections for 21st century possible. Middle fertility
rate simulation model has been constructed with the assumption that after 2015
migrations will be positive. This ‘strong’ assumption is based on the expectation that
Croatian several centuries long negative migration trends will be turned about in 21st
century and will make a significant contribution to improvement of demographic
balance. However, even with these assumptions, Croatian population projections
indicate that by the end of a century Croatia will have less than 3 millions of residents
i.e. almost 30% less than at the beginning of 21st century (Gelo et. al. 2005:219).
These projections are supported by two processes. The first is exact fact that Croatian
population was decreasing for around 10000 people annually between year 2001 and
2005. The second follows from the fact of increasing social sterility. Researches
show that the number of women who will not have children during their fertile
period, due not to biological sterility but to their own choice, will increase in Croatia
to 20%. It should be added that social sterility of this group will not be ‘compensated’
with higher number of those women’s children who have decided to give birth,
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because over 80% of newborns in Croatia are first and second born children
(Akrap/Èipin, 2006:108).
Having in mind the effect of population trends, we can see that the average annual
GDP per capita growth rate was close to 5%, hence higher than rate of GDP growth
which was approx. 4,8% in a period of seven years, 2001-2007 (Figure 3).
Figure 2: Level and rate of GDP growth ($1990) 2001-2007
Source: Statistical yearbook DZS (annual level), authors’ calculation
Figure 3: Level and rate of GDP per capita growth ($ 1990) 2001-2007
Source: Statistical yearbook DZS (annual level), authors’ calculation
While analyzing growth rates one should notice their relative volatility. Growth
rates have no continuous stable trend but sinusoid shape. Increase and the first ‘peek’
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is noted in the year 2002, followed by decrease in growth rates until 2004/05.
Afterwards there is an increase in growth rates in 2005 and 2006 with the second
‘peek’ in a year 2007 when a growth rate of 5,6%, the same as in 2002, was reached
(Figure 3). Recent developments initiated by global crisis in the second half of 2008
make expectations about decreasing growth rates realistic, which will give sinusoid
shape of business cycle to growth curve once again.
Positive and relatively satisfying growth rates in this period gain additional
significance when it is taken in consideration that they continue themselves on
already ‘recovered’ 2000 base year when (after short-term drop in 1999) the growth
rate was almost 5%. It should be noted that 21st century growth is mainly result of
increased investments which gives it special feature that should be additionally
analyzed due to various interpretations.
Differences can occur already while evaluating dynamics and level of
investments. That is why an interpretation could be found that share of investments in
GDP was highly increased in 2003, 2004 and 2005 (Babiæ, 2006:38). At the same
time, equally professionally relevant analysis claims about investment growth
deceleration in the second half of 2003 with even more evident slowdown in 2004
(Jankov, 2006:23).
In investment composition analysis, mistake can be caused by different
approaches. If investments are analysed according to ownership structure, the
economists who give advantage to influence of private investments on growth will
determine how, despite of progress of privatization process, it has not come to more
significant increase in share of private investments which is lower than 60% of total
investments (Babiæ, 2006:39). On the other hand there are some points of view that
consider every increase in GDP, in which more importantly participate investments
(especially private) as oppose to other aggregates, as encouraging sign of growth rate
quality (Martiæ, 2006:5).
Real developments, regardless of professional disagreements, still allow an
interpretation according to which it has come to significant changes in growth rates
quality. Namely, as oppose to former periods when consumption, especially
personal, generated growth, after 2000 investments gradually increase their share in
total expenditures. It is our belief that the government role in encouraging investment
activity is not disputable. On a contrary, due to the ‘paradox of thrift’ the government
is expected to intervene in economic activity whenever the economy is in
long-lasting recession or depression. We have seen that Croatian economy for 20
years, from the beginning of 1980’s till the end of 1990’s, was in a stagnation or
recession with mild signs of recovery in the second half of 1990’s. But regardless of
oscillations, when average annual growth rates are observed, Croatian economy has
been experiencing zero or negative growth rates in a long period from 1980-2000
ending with lower level of GDP in 2000 compared to 1980 as a consequence.
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In this type of situation, according to multiple empirically verified facts in several
market economies, occurs so called ‘paradox of thrift’. Paradox of thrift, as it is well
known, is fundamental for anti-recession i.e. economic policy of full employment in
(post) Keynesian tradition. More simply, individual virtue that is prudence and
caution in spending when signs of economic activity deceleration are observed,
becomes macroeconomic flaw that additionally causes and deepens economic
recession and/or depression. In fact, rational behavior of every individual motivates
him to compose of his income distribution according to expectations about future
economic trends. Since individual income is divided to a part which is being
consumed and a part which is being saved, concrete division will be carried out
depending on propensity to consume i.e. save. In this way, when a person expects a
period of prosperity, propensity to consume increases, and when a person expects a
drop in economic activity with possible consequences on its own position (possible
loss of job etc.), propensity to save increases. But when these rational individual
behaviors are ‘aggregated’ national economy level, ‘unexpected’ results occur.
Increased individual propensity to save results in ‘extraction’ of the part of
overall/national income from the circular flow and in its ‘storage’ into savings. In this
way, lower current income decreases consumption i.e. demand. Lower demand
causes decrease in supply i.e. decreased output. In the ‘second round’ decrease in
output lowers employment and thereby also income and therefore consumption in
two ways. Firstly, by the lower amount of compensation to (formerly) employed.
Secondly those who remained employed are increasing their propensity to save due
to lower employment expectations. The result is lower current income and demand
which ‘backfires’ in further output decrease. In this manner a ‘down turned’ spiral is
created that leads to recession and in particularly unfavorable cases to economic
depression too.
This is the environment that calls for anti-recession government full employment
economic policy. What we have here is actually the case of asymmetry of information
about market occurrences between individuals and government, because of which
intervention is desired and necessary. Each individual according to his/her
qualification and occupation attains information that is according to his/her own
choice relevant for his/her existence. In this sense, he/she is not interested in
macroeconomic consequences of his/her behavior. He/she is just concerned by
his/her own position. On the other hand, government and its economic institutions
and bodies dispose with complete information about interaction and overall effect of
key economic activity variables. At this level it is possible to notice early warning
signs of economic activity deceleration caused by insufficient demand i.e. intensified
‘withdrawal’ of current income into savings.
At that point, the government steps into the picture creating substitutes to
insufficient individual demand/consumption. It should be noted that when individual
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consumption is concerned it comprises both personal consumption of each individual
household member and investment consumption of an individual entrepreneur. The
government therefore by means of economic policy instruments, creates ‘missing’
demand in order to maintain full employment macroeconomic equilibrium and is
tasked to ensure preconditions for continuous growth.
In order to lead economic, particularly anti-recession policy, government in
market economies has instruments of monetary and fiscal policy on its disposal as the
main interventionist leverages. In the contemporary 21st century environment until
recently it has been common belief among professionals that stable currency and low
inflation were key preconditions to successful development as well as efficient
approach to international financial markets and optimization outward orientation.
That would also mean that the possibility of using monetary policy in enhancing
growth and attaining full employment has been significantly constrained by thus
proclaimed neutrality of monetary policy. Monetary institutions orientation towards
almost exclusively securing monetary stability, hard currency convertibility and low
inflation does not allow relaxed money issuing policies, growth oriented base money
creation, special loans, and subsidized interest rates any more.
Therefore the government is mostly left with instruments of fiscal policy i.e.
policy of government revenues and expenditures as instruments of active economic
policy. On the revenue side the main instrument is tax policy. Here anti—recession
policy would mean that lower taxes increases income and respectively
demand/consumption which encourages economic activity. If the government
desires to act through expenditures in encouraging aggregate demand/consumption,
it can make it through government social and other transfers that directly increase
income.
The additional ways to do it are government purchases and/or investments
especially in public construction works. Economic profession determined a long time
ago that public construction works has quantitatively and temporally very favorable
effect. That is why it is calculated that each kuna invested in construction has
multiplying effect on overall increase in income by three kunas i.e. multiplier of 3.
Besides, these investments, due to their long-term infrastructural effect, constitute
essential physical precondition for successful market operation.
Thus, this aspect of national economic policy in (post) transitional Croatian
economy conditions, that uses public investments in road construction and utilities to
encourage growth and employment, can be judged as almost textbook case study of
required policy instrument in specific posttransition recession. This surely does not
exclude the need for precise and objective costs efficiency analysis of said
investments. On the contrary, transparency, modern standards and procedures
implementation in all government purchases and procurement contracts are
important preconditions for public works efficiency. In addition, it should be
Croatian Economy Challenges in the Posttransitional Period 103
accentuated that infrastructural investments market justification is given by
professionally legitimate concept of infrastructural facilities excess supply.
Especially the concept of railway and road network construction by means of excess
supply is very well known since the beginning of industrialization particularly in
those economies that could be defined as ‘late comers’ into the speeded up
industrialization process (Èavrak, 2004:12). That was the case of 19th century
railway construction in the USA, in English colonies primarily Hong Kong and South
African Republic. Neoclassical concept of ‘waiting’ until overall economic
development create demand for necessary infrastructure facilities, that is market
situation when existing infrastructure becomes a constraint to business activity and
growth, has been practically turned about in this manner. Therefore it should be
additionally noted that the positive role of public infrastructural investments in
recession/depression stage of business cycles is unquestionable in macroeconomic
sense.
It should be specially emphasized that (post) transition character of national
economy strongly arguments validity of the concept. Ex-planned economies, among
which Croatia was included, had almost ‘endemically’ undeveloped infrastructure.
Due to specific way of national output accounting and ‘exotic’ data processing in
evaluating certain forms of economic activity, permanent underinvestment in
transportation infrastructure and its overall underdevelopment was more than
evident. That is why investments in transportation/communication infrastructure
facilities represent unavoidable condition for successful market transformation of
ex-planned economies.
Analysis of growth rates at the beginning of 21st century does not essentially
change general evaluation of Croatian economic growth during 20th century.
Although the recovery of growth rates is evident, their level is not enough to achieve
convergence towards EU average. Namely, to reach the average of (15 ‘old’) EU
countries, it ought to reach average 7% annual growth rate for the next 30 years. In
this sense, acceleration of growth surely remains among priorities of economic policy
(Druiæ, I. 2004:227). More precisely, fundamental redesign of economic policy in
direction of full employment and accelerated growth is needed.
Prices and Inflation
Price changes characterized by continuity of low inflation, is the main stronghold of
stabilization program positive evaluation which began in 1994. It is the economic
policy stronghold up to these days. In the economy that keeps 50 year period of hyper
and even galloping inflation deeply imprinted in its ‘historical’ collective the price
stability issue is never enough accentuated. Almost traumatic experience of not only
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disturbed relative prices relation but of entire system of (economic) values, wearing
discussions about peripheral economic issues, rent-seeking dominance in business
activity, permanent devaluation of money and labor etc. has significantly contributed
to discouragement of individual business initiative paralyzing Croatian economic
emancipation process. That is why stabilization program success confirmed in low
inflation and stable exchange rate as well as internal convertibility of domestic
currency it is of crucial importance.
Average annual inflation rate in a period 2001-2007 was around 2,7% which can
be rated as very satisfying. It annually varied from 1,5% in the year 2002 to 3,5% in
2005 and 3,7% in 2001 (Figure 4). In this relatively short period of time it is difficult
to asses the impact of price changes on business activity level. In this way it can be
empirically observed that in a period of increasing i.e. higher growth rates between
2001 and 2003 from 4,4% in 2001 to 5,6% in 2002 and 5,3% in 2003 the inflation rate
had a tendency of 2,5% to 1,5% drop, while in a period of lower growth rates from
3,8% in 2004 and 4,3% in 2005 the inflation had tendency of rising from 2,5% to
3,5%. The increase in growth rates in 2006 and 2007 resulted in decrease in inflation
rate below 3%. At the first sight it could be observed that famous ‘trade off’ between
inflation rate and growth rate, according to which stabilization and low inflation
result in growth rate decrease and vice versa does not exist. However, these
statements could be premature since we are discussing short periods of time. In
addition the probable time lag should be taken into the account. It is possible for low
inflation i.e. additional measures which decrease inflation in one year to have full
effect on economic growth in the next year.
While measuring inflation, one should bear in mind that various interpretations,
depending on index i.e. indicator used in the analysis, are possible. Here, we mostly
use Consumer Price Index (CPI). In more recent studies the main indicator of this
index is so called ‘base inflation’ (Core Inflation). Full positive stabilization effect
becomes clear here, because it were primarily decreasing rates of meat, clothes and
footwear prices that affected decrease of base and consequently total inflation. While
these free market prices display rational behavior depending on between supply and
demand relations, controlled prices behavior has been entirely different. The so
called ‘administrative’ prices that are set by government and/or local administration
decisions, such as water or utilities prices have risen for over 16% just in first eight
months of 2006 (Jankov, 2006: 3-4).
In order to get to the bottom of the ‘hidden’ inflation phenomena more detailed
analysis should also include cost, price and currency disparities. Namely, when
statistically lower inflation in Croatia in period 1994-2000 compared to some other
surrounding countries such as Czech, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, is put in a
context of relative price ratio, analytical image changes. In that period, according to
certain interpretations, prices of essential products in above mentioned countries
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were 20-40% lower than in Croatia, which was ‘hidden’ by appreciated kuna
exchange rate. So instead of ‘statistical’ annual inflation rate of 4,2% in that period,
inflation ‘corrected’ for ‘hidden’ price increase, could be possibly estimated at nearly
7% level (Bilušiæ, 2001:341).
Figure 4: Annual inflation rate and logarithmic price level 2001-2007
Source: Statistical yearbook DZS (annual level), authors’ calculation
Some recent claims estimate 15% appreciated kuna exchange rate in 1994-2005
period. In addition, risks of maintaining monetary stability (and thereby low
inflation) by exceptionally high degree of eurization in a situation of undeveloped
domestic capital market and significant exposure of commercial banks to exchange
rate risks are pointed out (Domazet, 2005: 118).
In this situation it does not hurt to remind one more time that the Croatian
economy’s highest growth rates period in 20th century from the second half of 50’s
till the beginning of 70’s coincides with inflation rates which were high (around
13%), but still almost four times lower than annual average 1950-1990. Similar
confirmation is given also by the data for American economy in 1990’s. High GDP
growth rate and full employment policy resulted in decrease (instead of expected
increase) in inflation rate, quite opposite of the IMF and World Bank predictions.
Employment and Productivity
Employment along with accompanying unemployment is multiply contestable
subject. Its significance is primarily of everyday existence nature. Job which
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provides an income for an individual and a family living standard is always of great
public interest. Inflation, price increase, GDP growth and balance of payments are
relatively abstract themes of interest to a narrow professional circle, whereas
employment is literately survival issue for many and therefore under a strong scrutiny
of almost every citizen. On the same practical i.e. empirical level is a fact that both
structural and cyclic unemployment are one of the ‘diseases’ ‘plaguing’ the market
economy in a manner that repeatedly question its efficiency.
Finally, there is also a separate environment of (post) transition economies that
has ‘naturally’ given birth to remarkable drop in employment and accompanying
high unemployment during the complex overall market restructuring and
stabilization process despite the significant older workforce ‘crowding out’ from the
labor market.
Observed empirical changes have been gradually shaped into more or less
successful theories. One of the famous is Phillips curve formulated through research
of relationship between inflation and unemployment in England and in the USA in a
period from the middle of 19th until the middle of 20th century. Analysis was
formalized in recognizable curve which plainly speaking shows that high
unemployment results in low inflation i.e. how low unemployment (full
employment) is accompanied by high(er) inflation. Fiercely debated ‘trade off’
between inflation and unemployment, according to which a price of low inflation is
high unemployment and price of full employment is high inflation, crumbled at the
beginning of 1970’s when developed market economies faced stagflation i.e.
situation where both high inflation and high unemployment along with stagnating
economic activity existed at the same time. That brought to modification/extension of
Phillips relation through implementation of expectations. The result was
‘dynamized’ curve which describes the relation between unemployment
increase/decrease rate and inflation increase/decrease rate. Practically it means that
high(er) unemployment does not result in low inflation but in decreasing inflation
rate i.e. decrease of inflation in long term. Conversely, low unemployment (full
employment) does not lead to high inflation but to increasing inflation rate i.e. to an
increase of inflation in long term (Blanchard, 2006:166-188).
Regardless of how effective this ‘adaptation’ of Phillips curve is in terms of
developed market economies, in (post) transition conditions even such
‘dynamization’ has not been successful. Vast econometric tests on 50-year period
that have included both pretransition and post transition period show that there is no
significant connection between inflation and unemployment rate, not in simple nor in
Philips curve model modified by expectations (Druiæ/Tica/Mamiæ, 2006:57).
Econometric findings direct to deeper analysis of long-term structural impacts on a
transition (especially Croatian) labor market. Possible explanation for non-existent
Phillips curve in pretransition period is specific category of illiquidity that has
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allowed insolvent companies existence through ‘virtual’ stocks enabling growth of
both employment and inflation at the same time (Druiæ, 2004:220). In post
transitional period regression analysis indicates that there is negative correlation
between unemployment and inflation. However, established relation is so weak that
an inflation process in Croatia in post transitional period can not be explained by
unemployment rate trend, but its explanation should be looked for outside of
economy’s real sector (Botriæ, V. 2005). One of the possible directions of
professional research is more detailed insight in structural causes of long-term
disparities of transition, and thereby Croatian, labor market. Econometric model
‘matching-functions’ tested on middle-European transition labor markets points to a
conclusion that long-lasting mismatch of supply and demand is primarily result of
simultaneous combined influence of structural changes characterized by processes of
deagrarization, deindustrialization and terciarization (Obadiæ, 2005:231). Additional
and ever more significant factor is educational process which essentially calibrates
the labor market supply composition. It should be more closely investigated just how
‘wide spectrum’ Croatian educational system, that was relatively successful in a
period of the ‘third wave’ i.e. industrialization, is adjusted to post industrial
environment of knowledge economy respecting initial beliefs that existing process is
incompatible with cyber/ knowledge society postulates (Polšek, 2004:272).
Analyzed theoretical debates place empirical analysis in the area of minuteness
section and cautious claims. Such analysis required ‘purification’ of available labor
statistics, concerning especially the category ‘active farmers’. Namely, their number
is not so much a result of accounting exact number of market surpluses producing
registered farmers but is a product of their propensity to pay contributions for
retirement or health insurance which serves as a base for their statistic records. Since
farmers’ propensity to pay contributions highly fluctuates in certain time periods,
(in)consistency of time series demanded their exclusion from the observation. It
should be added that employment data are less, and unemployment more, affected by
changes in way of recording both unemployed and employed. Special establishment
of Labor Force Survey unemployment next to registered unemployment along with
increasing ‘bureaucratization’ of unemployment/employment registration process
can in Croatian case increase/lower the number of unemployed for 60-80000.
Importance of conclusions that are being imposed by empirical research, has made it
necessary to stress constraints regarding the reliability of findings that are the
consequence of frequent methodological changes and constant harmonization with
Eurostat standards among other issues. These constraints give ground to partial
softening of relatively unfavorable evaluations of long-term employment trends.
Positive fact that ought to be highlighted is the shift of unemployment changes
trend. After entire decade 1990-2000 of stagnation and negative employment rates,
long expected and desired changes finally occured. At the beginning of 21st century
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in a period from 2001-2007 encouraging employment growth could be noted.
Average annual growth rate varied around 2,8% which resulted in total increase in
number of employed of around 200 000 or on average near 34 000 annually. (Figure
5)
Figure 5: Level and rates of unemployment growth 2001-2007
Source: Statistical yearbook DZS (annual level), authors’ calculation
Analysis impartiality requires confrontation of above mentioned desired
employment trends with accompanying notably worrying developments.
The first unfavorable factor is productivity curve. Despite thorough structural
changes that resulted in significant and long-lasting unemployment growth which
was expected to enable growth of productivity and competitiveness in a situation of
positive GDP growth rates, the real trends are different.
Croatian economy has entered 21st century ‘cleansed’ from the burden of so
called ‘socialist mastodons’ i.e. former large companies burdened by low
productivity, high ‘hidden’ unemployment, out-of-date technology and
old-fashioned business organization. Significant number of companies has vanished
in several bankruptcy waves and the others have undergone thorough market
restructuring. Employees at the time have either left labor market their working
activity (to the greater extent) or have entered liberated labor market actively looking
for a job (to the lesser extent). At same time regardless the high (tax) expenses of two
bank crisis on one hand and inefficient privatization process on the other hand,
relatively efficient financial market has nevertheless been established. Capital market
has been liberalized which resulted in significant inflow of foreign investments and
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growth of foreign (more developed/more modern) capital ownership portfolio in the
Croatian economy.
These are recognized ingredients of quality and fast growth based on productivity
growth as the main indicator of increasing competition potential of developed
economies.
However, actual performances of this quality growth factor in Croatia clearly
indicate stagnation. In the 2001-2007 period labor productivity measured by GDP
per worker (in 1990 USD) increases slowly from below 20 000$ in 2001 to around 22
000$ of annual output per employed in 2007. (Figure 6) This performance of one of
the key macroeconomic indicators directly and indirectly affects behavior of all other
important macroeconomic variables. It especially refers to international
competitiveness of national economy that represents one of the important dividing
lines of independent economic survival in case of a small open economy such as
Croatian.
Figure 6: GDP and GDP per employed ($ 1990) 2001-2007
Source: Statistical yearbook DZS (annual level), authors’ calculation
The second unfavorable factor is low work force participation. Two different
calculations display hardly understandable findings. Participation of work force
share (employed + unemployed) in total population has been around 36%. Since
participation share is between 50-60% in developed countries, these indicator places
Croatia in a group of world’s most unsuccessful economies such as Mali or Chad
(Druiæ/Tica, 2002:123). Work force participation calculated as a share in population
older than 15 years gives a participation rate of around 50%, whereas participation in
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transition countries from Lithuania and Latvia, to Czech and Slovakia to Slovenia is
around 70% (Katiæ, 2006:34).
Third unfavorable factor is that, although positive, Croatian employment growth
rate at the beginning of 21st century can not contribute significantly to the solution of
unemployment problem. Namely, with existing annual employment growth rate
Croatian economy would reach pretransitional level of employment in 7-8 years or
quarter of century after the beginning of transition.
Fourth unfavorable factor is connected to reaching full employment as final goal
of stable market economy growth. Full employment is defined as the employment
where frictional unemployment does not exceed 4-5%. If we quantify full
employment at the participation rate of reasonable (middle-European) 70%, Croatian
economy would reach full employment in approx. 30 years via existing employment
growth rates.
Clearly, these tentative findings must be subdued to strict economic analysis and
verification. However, that will not essentially influence the fact that active
structurally redesigned economic policy of full employment supported by pro-birth
population policy is unavoidable.
Change of Global Context
At each moment these long-term Croatian economy challenges should be put in a
context of actual global occurrences to which clearly point still uncomprehended
immensity of world (for now) financial crisis. Financial collapse tide wave that
gradually spills over to real economy sectors impacts overall business activity in each
economy including Croatian. It has also an additional impact on (post) transition
economies because the Washington consensus abandoning and ‘hands washing’ is in
progress.
Abandonment of up to recently unquestionable paradigm of stabilization
package; structural (privatizational/denationalizational) adjustments, hard budget
constraints, monetary anchors and fixed exchange rate, evolves gradually and as it
seems pressured by recent occurrences. Revision has begun at unexpected place in
Sweden, country that usually is not in any arrangement with international financial
institutions. Its economic renesanse with growth rates over 5% is attributed to
industrial export growth whose share in GDP has increased from 27% in 1990’s to
52% in 2000’s. However, export growth is almost exclusively attributed to real
devaluation of Swedish crown (Munchau, 2006). Detailed comparative sector
analysis of Swedish economy conducted in 1990’s and 2000’s has shown
productivity growth as the key instrument of successful growth, especially annual
productivity growth in private sector of 3,3% in 12 years from 1992-2004
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(McKinsey, 2006:22). But the main obstacle to further growth next to public sector is
services sector. That is how, for instance, productivity in commerce is more than 10%
lower than in the USA, and achieved productivity growth is attributed to decrease in
number of employed, not to output growth (McKinsey, 2006:124). Analysis strongly
suggests that real exchange rate, i.e. devaluation by itself can not result in growth of
export competitiveness if it is not followed by important shift in labor productivity in
key industrial exporting sectors. Similarly, productivity growth will not give
expected results unless it is followed by monetary/exchange rate policies. Here, one
can recognize one possible lesson for Croatian economy and Croatian economic
disputes. The right question is not the one of real exchange rate i.e. for or against
devaluation. The real question is how to get to substantially and temporally
consistent combination of economic/industrial and exchange rate policy which will
in programmed stages result in growth of export competitiveness and real sector
export growth.
However, final act of complete renunciation of Washington consensus came from
World Bank itself which has experienced complete turnabout of until recently
‘untouchable’ neoclassical cannons of market and institutional fundamentalism by
producing ‘Spence commission" report. Unquestionable receipts for liberalization,
deregulation and free market prescribed everywhere independently of each country’s
specific context, vanished from WB economists’ professional radar. By explaining
reasons for breakdown of universally prescribed, reforms ‘cooked’, in Washington,
the need for gradual unconventional approach in each country, with respect to social
and economic context, is accentuated. Nevertheless, the most damaging impact to
neoliberal concept came from empirically confirmed spectacular growth of entire
spectrum of countries, especially India and China, that were led in their (different)
economic policies by goals and instruments essentially different from stabilization
IMF/WB packages (Rodrik, 2008:1-2). These are strong lessons/messages to
Croatian economy conveying that only growth based on productivity, employment
and domestic savings growth has positive long-term instead of short-term/sporadic
results.
Finally, the unexpectedly dramatic effect has been produced by actual global
economic crisis, initiated primarily by the collapse of unregulated US financial
derivatives market that has swiftly spread to regulated financial markets and through
them is gradually influencing real economy sectors as well. Concentric circles of
crisis have begun in a form of different ‘bubbles’ or more precisely, different forms
of ‘financial bubble’. Real estate industry bubble, mortgage bubble, securities
bubble, bonds bubble, credit bubble, hedge funds bubble now burst in a form greatest
real and financial sector collapse since the Great Depression at the end of 1920’s. It is
claimed that the collapse of security markets in one week of 2008 equals the drop
which occurred in two days in 1929 (Roubini, 2008a). Actual situation has been
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described as ‘the most inflated’ financial bubble in a history of market economies and
therefore probable outcomes of overall global crisis are widely discussed. In most
cases conclusion is that the way to avoid catastrophe is to conduct far more radical
market and institutional reforms than the ones for which American (and other)
government(s) has (have) been prepared implement. At the beginning it has been
confined only to injecting ever bigger amounts in billions and trillions of dollars into
nonperformed loans of bankrupt financial sector. All of these measures were proved
insufficient and their calming effect on stock exchange and general financial sector
lasted not long enough to achieve stability.
Pressured by depth and scale of economic collapse, even conservative
governments, particularly the one in the USA, had to make radical i.e. ‘heretical’
policy turnaround. Vehement preachers of unbounded free market, that have
evaluated the very democracy/civilization progress of certain countries by the degree
of ‘market freedom’ and minimal government interference into the economy, were
forced to accept ‘yesterday’ still unimaginable measures of ‘socialization’ of their
economies. These ‘interventionist pills‘ encompass the new round of global decrease
in interest rates, temporary guarantee for all saving and other deposits until the
decision which banks will be liquidated, which will be partially nationalized.
Following is fast release of household debt burden (mostly by mortgage loans) and
freezing the foreclosures. In addition, the government policy of unlimited
public/budget financing of solvent but momentarily illiquid companies, massive
government package of direct financing that includes public works has been
proposed. Finally, infrastructural works are planned, together with unemployment
compensation, tax relieves for low-income households etc. (Nouri, 2008b).
(Post) transitional environment of Croatian economy demands, however, more
thorough investigation of morphology of most recent American/global economic
crisis due to possible multiplying effects. It is important in this type of analysis not to
confuse roots/causes with inducement of the crisis. That is way the lack of confidence
in financial markets and institutions is inducement or result, but not the root of the
problem in this case. The first cause is a bad ‘soft loan" policy. It has been displayed
in real estate bubble that has overheated the economy and whose burst will mean
drastic drop in real estate prices, thereby lowering the prices on mortgage market and
damaging financial institutions balance sheets in the process whose bad loans nobody
wants to buy.
The second cause of American breakdown is growth generated by (personal)
consumption financed by high leverage borrowing that will have to be decreased, and
that will (in recession conditions) even more clearly mirror the weakness of financial
system (Stiglitz, 2008:2).
Every aspect of global economic crisis evidently reflects challenges of Croatian
economy in sharpened perspective. Positive (medium high) annual Croatian GDP
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growth rates close to 5% in 2000’s were stimulated by high personal (housing) and
government (infrastructure) consumption. Constraint to such growth is, amongst
others, in the fact that both of these components of final consumption were financed
by galloping external debt increase that practically equals the GDP volume.
Main challenge in this environment is the economic policy redesign in a way to
encourage those real economy activities (especially small and medium size
entrepreneurship) that would create new jobs, productivity increase i.e. higher
competitiveness. Financial industry should be encouraged to commit more diligently
to the real economy projects promising growth and new more efficient and
productive jobs. Simultaneously, profound policy redesign can not surmount
transparent instruments creation that would efficiently restrain speculative drainage
of healthy and necessary financial ‘bloodstream" in rapidly disappearing
international financial oasis. This kind of parasite behavior particularly endangers
‘narrow’ and ‘shallow’ financial markets like Croatian. Exclusive groups of
‘asymmetric’ information holders and protagonists of different ‘clique/
oligopolistic" groups and arrangements could be particularly dangerous to stabile
market conditions. With privileged access to the bills and bylaws creation process
and beforehand knowledge of future government economic policy measures they can
lead to a catastrophe both by reckless risks in a race for high profits in expansion and
uncontrolled panic in recession. It seems that especially certain investment funds
behaviors in actual Croatian capital market situation consistently follow this pattern.
Possible positive effect of these challenges is that their analytical agregate makes
a good starting point of departure towards prudent development-oriented market
policy option for the Croatian economy. It would probably be close to Scandinavian
model that mostly avoided Great Depression in 1929, and up to now seems to be
coping well with its ‘vampire awakening spirit’ of the 2008 Great Breakdown.
Success of this modern designed market economic policy crucially depends on
long-term social consensus among main political options about its basic components.
Such desired consensus must be socially acceptable to the healthy population
majority, and thereby out of reach for daily political practice.
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